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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contempt of Court-Civil or Criminal
The two types of contempt proceedings recognized in the United
States are criminal and civil.1 Criminal contempt proceedings are those
brought to preserve the power and to vindicate the dignity of the court
and to punish disobedience of its processes and orders.2 Usually they
are separate and independent proceedings at law, with the public on one
side and the respondent on the other. 3 The purpose of the sentence in
such proceedings is punitive as it is in the public interest to vindicate
the authority of the court and to deter other like derelictions.4 On the
other hand, civil contempt proceedings are those instituted to preserve
and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of such parties.5 These
proceedings are remedial and coercive in their nature, and the parties
chiefly interested in their conduct and prosecution are those individuals
for the enforcement of whose private rights and remedies the suits were
instituted. 6
This distinction between the two types of contempt has been recognized in North Carolina. The North Carolina Supreme Court said in
7
Galyon v. Stutts:
"With us contempts are defined and classified generally by
two statutes: G. S. 5-1 and G. S. 5-8. These statutes recognize
'Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 111 (1924); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey
Company, 194 U. S. 324, 328 (1904); Boylan v. Detrio, 187 F. 2d 375, 378 (5th
Cir. 1951); Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946) ; In re
Nevitt, 177 Fed. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902); Blackard v. Arkansas, 217 Ark. 661,
664, 232 S. W. 2d 977, 979 (1950); State ex tel. Jones v. Miller, 147 Kan.
242, 243, 75 P. 2d 239, 240 (1938); Marcum v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 1, 6,
113 S. W. 2d 462, 465 (1938) ; Holt v. McLaughlin, 357 Mo. 844, 845, 210 S. W.
2d 1006, 1007 (1948) ; Swanson v. Swanson, 10 N. J. Super. 513, -, 77 A. 2d 477,
480 (1950); Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N. M. 640, 643, 139 Pac. 154, 156 (1914);
Bridges v. Oklahoma, 9 Okla. Crim. 450, 452, 132 P. 503, 504 (1913); Lief v.
Lief, 14 N. J. Misc. 27, -, 178 Atl. 762, 763 (1935) ; O'Brien v. State ex rel. Bibb,
26 Tenn. App. 270, 273, 170 S. W. 2d 931, 932 (1942) ; Local 333B, United Marine
Division of International Longshoreman's Ass'n. v. Virginia Ferry Corp., 193 Va.
773, 779, 71 S. E. 2d 159, 163 (1952).
- Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946). See also, 17 C. J. S.
Contempt § 5 (1939).
'Ex parte Grossman, 276 U. S. 87, 111 (1924).
"Blackward v. Arkansas, 217 Ark. 661, 664, 232 S. W. 2d 977, 979 (1950).
'Ex parte Joe L. Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 314, 95 So. 755, 760 (1923) ; Marcum
v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 1, 6, 113 S. W. 2d 462, 465 (1938); Galyon v.
Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954). See also, 12 Am. Jim.
Contempt § 6 (1938).
7241 N. C. 120, 124, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
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and preserve the fundamental distinction between civil and criminal contempt in substance but not in name. Acts or omissions
which ordinarily constitute criminal contempt as defined in the
textbooks are designated by our statute (G. S. 5-1) as punishable 'for contempt,' without further designation; the acts or
omissions which ordinarily constitute civil contempt as defined
in the books are designated by our statute (G. S. 5-8) as punishable 'as for contempt.' Thus, under our statutes the proceedings
for criminal and civil contempt are 'for contempt' and 'as for
contempt,' respectively."
In an earlier case,8 the North Carolina Supreme Court had this to
say:
"A person guilty of any of the acts or omissions enumerated in
the eight subsections of G. S. § 5-1 may be punished for contempt because such acts or omissions have a direct tendency
to interrupt the proceedings of the court or to impair the respect due to its authority. A person guilty of any of the acts or
neglects catalogued in the seven subdivisions of G. S. § 5-8 is
punishable as for contempt because such acts or neglects tend
to defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice the rights or remedies
of a party to an action pending in court."
The statutes to be discussed in this note are N. C. General Statutes
§ 5-1, § 5-4, § 5-8 (1953). The pertinent subsection of G. S. § 5-1 is
subsection three, which reads as follows:
"Any person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:
3. Wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by
any court."
The punishment for a violation of this statute is limited by G. S.
§ 5-4, which provides:
"Punishment for contempt for matters set forth in the preceding sections shall be by fine not to exceed two hundred and
fifty dollars, or imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or both,
in the discretion of the court."
The applicable subsection of G. S. § 5-8 is subsection two:
"Every court of record has power to punish as for contempt
when the act complained of was such as tended to defeat, impair,
impede or prejudice the rights or remedies of a party to an action,
then pending in court' Luther v. Luther, 234 N. C. 429, 431, 67 S. E. 2d 345, 347 (1951).
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2. Parties to suits, attorneys, and all other persons for the nonpayment of any sum of money ordered by such court in cases
where execution cannot be awarded for the collection of the
same."
Much confusion has arisen in the application of these statutes. The
statutes heve been applied by the lower courts and the attorneys to the
wrong situations. In several cases, 9 the lower court has sentenced the
offender to imprisonment until he should comply with the court's orders.
The supreme court in considering these cases has said that the action
was brought under G. S. § 5-1, but in reversing on other grounds (lack
of evidence to show willful failure to comply with the court's orders),
the court has failed to mention that the sentences were in conflict with
G. S. § 5-4 which limits the imprisonment under G. S. § 5-1 to thirty
days. Probably the court failed to mention the conflict because it was
reversing on other grounds, but it is submitted that if it had discussed
it, or had said that the facts presented made out a situation under
G. S. § 5-8, punishment for which is not limited by G. S. § 5-4, some of
the confusion as to which statute to use would have been removed. It
was thought that this confusion would be cleared up by the court's statement in Galyon v. Stutts,i 0 in which the court indicated which statute
was applicable to which situation. But not all of this has been eliminated, as evidenced by the recent case of Basnight v. Basnight."i"
In that case a wife had been awarded one hundred dollars per
month as support for herself and her children. Her husband had failed
to make these support payments, and the wife instituted contempt proceedings to compel payment. The lower court found the husband guilty
of willfully and contumaciously failing to make the payments and sentenced him to imprisonment until he should comply with the order.
Upon appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court split three to three
for reversal on the ground that the evidence did not make out the willful
and contumacious failure to pay, but reduced the sentence to thirty
days' imprisonment, saying that the sentence for contempt was limited
by G. S. § 5-4 to thirty days.
The action was to enforce payment of support. Many jurisdictions,' 2
' Lamm v. Lamm, 229 N. C. 248, 49 S. E. 2d 403 (1948) ; Smithwick v. Smithwick, 218 N. C. 503, 11 S.E. 2d 455 (1940) ; Vaughan v. Vaughan, 213 N. C.
189, 195 S.E.
351 (1938); West v. West, 199 N. C. 12, 153 S.E. 600 (1930).
S2Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
11242 N. C. 645, 89 S. E. 2d 259 (1955).
104 So. 561, 565 (1924);
12Robertson v. Alabama, 20 Ala. App. 514, -,
Henderson v. Henderson, 86 Ga. App. 812, 814, 72 S. E. 2d 731, 733 (1952);
Perry v. Perry, 165 Ind. 67, 74 N. E. 609 (1905) ; Barrett v. Barrett, 287 Ky.
216, 220, 152 S. W. 2d 610, 613 (1941); Thomas v. Thomas, 132 Neb. 827, 830,
273 N. W. 483, 484 (1937) ; Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N. M. 640, 643, 139 Pac. 154,
154 (1914); Ex parte Bighorse, 178 Okla. 218, 219, 62 P. 2d 487, 489 (1936);
Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, 68 Utah 114, 208 P. 2d 1113 (1949) ;
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including North Carolina,"3 have said that contempt proceedings for the
enforcement of alimony and support payments are civil rather than
criminal. This seems to be the logical proceeding as alimony and support are private rights secured by a court order for the benefit of the
wife or children,' 4 and, as noted above, the purpose of these contempt
proceedings is to enforce the private rights of parties to suits and to
compel obedience to the court's orders for the benefit of these parties.r
It was stated in the plaintiff's brief that the contempt proceeding had
been brought under G. S. § 5-1. It is submitted that the wife's interests would have been better served if the contempt proceeding had
been brought under G. S. § 5-8.10 This statute has been said to embody
the textbook definition of civil contempt.' 7 The punishment for civil
contempt is usually imprisonment of an indefinite duration, that is, until
the offender shall comply with the court's order or process1s Therefore, G. S. § 5-8 should have been used, as it is not limited in its punishment, and because an unlimited imprisonment has the desired coercive effect, whereas a limited imprisonment only punishes the offender
who, upon completion of his sentence, cannot again be tried for contempt for the same dereliction, as the prior action would be res judicata
in the second action.
Obviously the wife brought the contempt proceeding to coerce the
husband into paying the support rather than to punish him for his disobedience of the court's order. In view of this fact, it is respectively
submitted that despite the apparent error of plaintiff's attorney in asserting that the contempt proceeding was under G. S. § 5-1, the court
should have ignored this contention, pointed out that the facts made
out a case under G. S. § 5-8, and affirmed the sentence of the lower
court. By so doing, the court would not only have more effectively reSimmons v. Simmons, 66 S. D. 76, 78, 278 N. W. 537, 538 (1938); Eddens v.
Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 523, 50 S. E. 2d 397, 403 (1949) ; Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va.
761, 95 S. E. 199 (1918). See also, 12 Am. JUR. Contempt § 6 (1938).
"Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N. C. 634, 197 S.E. 157 (1938).
"Cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 93 N. C. 418, 420 (1885). See also, 17 Am. Jun.

Divorce and Separation § 496 (1938).
" Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); Blackwood v.
Arkansas, 217 Ark. 661, 664, 232 S. W. 2d 977, 979 (1950) ; Cromartie v. Commissioner, 85 N. C. 211, 215 (1881).
20 It
is assumed that the plaintiff was privileged to bring the action under
G. S. § 5-8 as it was stated in the plaintiff's brief that the husband did not own any
property upon which an execution would lie.

Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); Chitwood v.
Eyman, 74 Ariz. 334, 343, 248 P. 2d 884, 890 (1952) ; Hervey v. Hervey, 186 Ark.
179, 52 S. W. 2d 963 (1932) ; State ex rel. Cash v. District Court of First Judicial
District, 78 Mont. 92, 95, 252 Pac. 388, 399 (1927) ; Delozier v. Bird, 123 N. C.
689, 694, 31 S. E. 834, 835 (1898) ; Cromartie v. Commissioner, 85 N. C. 211,
216 (1881) ; Hutchinson v. Canon, 6 Okla. 725, 55 Pac. 1077 (1898); Phillips v.
Phillips, 165 Wash. 616, 6 P. 2d 61 (1931).
1
21
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solved the rights of the litigants, but would have succeeded in clearing
up a considerable amount of the confusion which has so long existed in
this area.
SPENCER L. BLAYLOCK, JR.
Contracts-Conditional Acceptances-Variations in
the Construction of the Offeree's Language
There is uniform adherence to the rules that: (1) "To consummate
a valid contract an acceptance must be unequivocal and must not change,
add to or qualify the terms of the offer."' (2) Variations do not change,
add to or qualify the terms of the offer when additional language is
framed in words of request 2 or when additional language merely recites
conditions implied in fact or in law from the offer.3 Paradoxically,
however, there seems to be little uniformity in the application of these
rules to individual cases in which the language, although not changing
the terms of the price, or nature of the subject matter of the contract,
does to some extent create contingencies. The following cases, all concerned with transactions for the sale of real estate, with the exception
of one, are illustrative of this problem.
The phrase "subject to" has traditionally been a conditional expression. 4 One court, in construing what it determined to be a conditional acceptance said: "The meaning usually attributed to such
words as 'subject to' is that a promise that is so limited is a conditional promise, one that is different from that for which the offeror
bargained." 5 However, in a recent North Carolina case, the court had
no difficulty in construing the defendant's use of "subject to" as a
phrase which did not affect the validity of an acceptance.0 Defendant
had used the following language in replying to plaintiff's offer. "Your
telegram... is accepted subject to details to be worked out by you and
[my lawyer]."'

Defendant contended that his reply did not constitute

an acceptance because the language was conditional.

The court decided

that the phrase "subject to details to be worked out . . ." was "an ex-

pression of hope or suggestion." s In the court's discussion may be found
1 Recent Cases, 20 GIN. L. REv. 68, 69 (1952).
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 79 (rev. ed. 1936).
Id. § 78.
'1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 61 (1950).
'Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, -, 266 P. 2d 856, 862
(1954).
2

Carver v. Britt, 241 N. C. 538, 85 S. E. 2d 888 (1955).
85 S. E. 2d at 889.
' Id. at 541, 85 S. E. 2d at 890. The court quoted as follows from 17 C. J.S.,
CONTRACTS at 384: "'If an offer is accepted as made, the acceptance is not conditional and does not vary from the offer because of inquiries whether the offeror
will change his terms, or as to future acts, or by the expression of a hope, or
suggestion as to terms, or by the intimation that a time be fixed for the con'

'Id.
at 539,
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an inference to the effect that although the use of "subject to" would
not invalidate the acceptance, if "provided" had been substituted for
"subject to" the contract would never have been formed.0 This distinction without further inquiry into the facts of the case would certainly appear to be precious.
In the following two cases the respective courts reached opposing
decisions as to the legal effect of the language in each case, although the
language of both cases seems to convey substantially the same meaning.
Quaere as to which of the following replies is conditional:
"Please send your abstract to me at once, at the address below.
I will have same brought up to date and examined and proceed
to close up the matter with you.' 0
"We would like to have you send on the deed and abstract to the
Iowa State Bank of Waterloo, Iowa, and when they are examined, and found to be correct, your money will be turned
11
over to you."
The first reply was construed to be an acceptance.
to the matter of forwarding the abstract, the court said:

In refering

"It is not such a change as amounted to a qualification of the
original offer. . . . Plaintiff was not bound to accept the conveyance if the title proved to be unsatisfactory. This being so,
the matter of furnishing the abstract was merely a detail which
12
did not change the terms of the contract.'
In the second case, the court in rejecting the contention that the
added language was a "collateral or subsequent suggestion or request"
said:
"Unless the so called request or suggestion is a matter clearly
apart from the acceptance, and the intention of the writer to
declare his acceptance of the offer as made without regard to the
matter of his request is apparent, the letter ought to be read as
a whole and words which fairly import a new or additional condition to the terms proposed in the offer should be so construed,
3
and the acceptance held to be insufficient."'
In this case the court was very much influenced by defendant's use of
summation of the transactions, or because the offeror otherwise expresses dissatisfactions with the offer or adds immaterial words which do not in legal effect
qualify the offer. .2.

Ibid.

10

Bushmeyer v. McGary, 112 Ark. 373, 376, 166 S. W. 168 (1911).

"Knox v. McMurray, 159 Iowa 171, 176, 140 N. W. 652, 653 (1913).
-Bushmeyer v. McGary, 112 Ark. 353, 378, 166 S. W. 168, 169 (1911).
"'Knox v. McMurray, 159 Iowa 171, 184, 140 N. W. 652, 657 (1913).
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the word "when" in his purported acceptance. 14 Certainly the word
"when" was used but what difference should this really make? In the
former case, the fact that the offeree did not intend to proceed with
"closing up the matter" until he had received the abstract, had it brought
up to date and had determined the correctness of the title seems to create the same
impression of contingency as the literal use of the word
"when."' 5
These inconsistencies in the interpretation of language which goes
to the making of contracts are not confined to cases which arise in
different jurisdictions. A similar comparison may be made of two
cases decided by the North Carolina court. In Hall v. Jones,'8 the
North Carolina court found the following to be conditional: "I accept
your offer ....

I will have the deed fixed up within fifteen or twenty

days and mailed to you; then you can sign the deed and send it to the
Deposit and Savings Bank ... with intructions to deliver to me upon

'
the payment of $1,500.00, or if you prefer, I will come to Bluefield." 7
Yet, in Ruckers v. Sanders,'8 the court found the acceptance to be
unconditional where the offeree, while not otherwise qualifying his
reply added this language: "Just draw on me here at Greensboro with

your ...

stock attached to draft and I will honor same."' 9

In the first

case the court said: "The buyer has no right to attach any conditions,
if he proposes to hold the seller upon the original offer." 20 The court,
in the second case, based its decision upon the theory that a "condition
which goes to the making of the contract" should be distinguished from
These distinc"a suggestion relating to the ultimate performance."''
tions, on their face appear to be precious to a degree which certainly
seems fortuitous to anyone faced with the business of preparing to litigate a case concerned with the problem of conditional language in the
22
acceptance.
"Id. at 182, 140 N. W. at 676.
' Perhaps the essential problem in both of these cases amounted to determining
whether the acceptor-offeree intended to promise to buy if title was marketable as
distinguished from its being satisfactory (implying greater qualifications than
marketablity) to the purchaser or to someone approving the property for him.
However, neither court seemed to consider this point.
1- 164 N. C. 199, 80 S. E. 228 (1913).
27 Id. at 200, 80 S. E. at 228.
The offer to which this language was a reply
read: "I am just in receipt of your letter, inquiring for cash price on the Calloway farm. I will take fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.) cash for it ..
18 182 N. C. 607, 109 S. E. 857 (1921).
21Id. at 608, 109 S. E. at 857. This reply was in answer to the defendant's
letter stating that he owned 50 shares of stock which he would sell for $10,000.00.
0 Hall v. Jones, 164 N. C. 199, 200, 80 S. E. 228, 229 (1913).
'1 Ruckers v. Sanders, 182 N. C. 607, 609, 109 S. E. 857, 858 (1921).
"--The confusion which results from the varied interpretation of similar language
in these cases has not been alleviated by their classification according to the decisions in the cases. Thus, the language of Hall v. Jones is classified as conditional, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS, § 77, n. 10 (rev. ed. 1936), whereas the language
of Ruckers v. Sanders is classified as conditional language which does not qualify
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In the way of a guide through the apparent confusion presented by
a comparison of these cases, it is submitted that latent in most of the
cases involving the problem of conditional language of a borderline
nature are elements from which may be inferred a principle of an
equitable nature. Although this can in no way replace the objective
method of interpreting the language of the offer and acceptance as it appears on its face, it might be helpful in reconciling the apparent inconsistencies of the the judicial construction of "acceptance" language in
some of the cases, and it might be helpful in predicting the results
of an untried case.
This principle might be said to derive from the fundamental assumption that the law not only redresses injury, but also conserves the
value of the expectation of gain which constitutes the substructure of
commercial enterprise. 23 A comparison of Carver v. Britt24 and James
v. Darby25 yields a fairly clear illustration of this principle.
The Darby case concerned the legal effect of the following language:
"If details are satisfactorily arranged, I have decided to accept....
This language was held to be conditional. Although there are other
differences in the factual situations of these two cases, the substantial
difference which very probably accounts for the different construction
of the language lies in the character of the actions of the parties. In
the Darby case, although the defendant sold the property after he had
received the plaintiff's letter containing the purported acceptance, he
notified the plaintiff of the sale, and in addition explained the reasons
he had decided to sell elsewhere. By his explanation (which was presented in evidence) the defendant made it clear that he was genuinely
uncertain as to the plaintiff's sincere desire to complete the sale, in
spite of the purported acceptance. In a word, the surrounding evidence made it clear that the defendant did not intend arbitrarily to cut
the plaintiff off from an expected source of gain.
The character of the defendant's action in the Carver case was otherwise. There the defendant, while the plaintiff was endeavoring to "work
out the details" with the defendant's lawyer, told the plaintiff that he
would "straighten things out with him."'2 7 Yet on the next day the dethe legal effect of the offer, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 78 n. 4 (rev. ed. 1936)
without any explanation for the conflict.
3 Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 580 (1933) : "Finally,
the recovery that the law allows to the injured promisee is not determined by what
he lost in relying on the promise, but rather what he would have gained if the
promise had been kept. There are obviously many cases where the injured party
is substantially no worse after the breach than if the contract had never been made.
He has thus not been in fact injured. . . . The policy of the law, then, is not
merely to redress injuries but also to protect certain kinds of expectation by
making men live up to certain promises." (Italics added.)
2241 N. C. 538, 85 S. E. 2d 888 (1955).
2' 100 Fed. 224 (9th Cir. 1927).
2 Id. at 225.
2' Carver v. Britt, 241 N. C. 538, 540, 85 S. E. 2d 888, 889 (1955).
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fendant abruptly sold the property in question to a third party without
further discussing the matter with the plaintiff, although at all times
the plaintiff was available to the defendant. The defendant thereafter
remained evasive and uncommunicative after he had sold the property
to a third party, and never so much as acknowledged the efforts of the
plaintiff in attempting to secure a buyer for the plaintiff's property.
Another instance in which it appears that the court in construing the
legal effect of an alleged acceptance looked beyond the language to the
character of the actions of the parties is found in Knox v. McMurray.28
In that case business men used what the court decided was conditional
language in attempting to accept the offer of a "layman" who was ignorant of business methods, and who had expressed his ignorance to the
buyers in correspondence with them. In spite of the defendant's hesitancy to enter into a binding agreement, the plaintiffs pressed him to
make an offer to which they replied with language which the court held
to be conditional. 29 Similar language had, in another case, been held to
30
constitute a valid acceptance.
In Skinner v. Stone,31 the court rejected the defendant's contention
that the plaintiff conditionally qualified his acceptance by requesting that
the defendant have acknowledged a deed and return it, draft attached, to
the plaintiff's bank. In that case, in rejecting the contention that the
plaintiff's acceptance was conditional, the court, in its opinion, emphasized the following facts:
"It appears from the testimony that appellant [defendant] made
no response to the letter of July 5th, but instead came down to
[the county where the land was located] and made inquiry about
its then market value without letting appellee [plaintiff-buyer]
know of his presence in the neighborhood. Finally, when pressed
to close the deal in accordance with the correspondence ... , appellant declined to do so upon the ground that the mind of the
'32
parties had not met upon essential details.
From these statements of the court it may be inferred that in deciding that the plaintiff's acceptance was unconditional the court was influenced by the fact that the defendant used the plaintiff's belief that a
2 159 Iowa 171, 140 N. W. 652 (1913).
20 Id. at 176, 140 N. W. at 653. 'Wewould like to have you send on the deed
and abstract to the Iowa State Bank of Waterloo, Iowa, and when they are ex-

amined, and found to be correct, your money will be turned over to you."
" Bushmeyer v. McGary, 112 Ark. 373, 376, 166 S. W. 168 (1911). In
that case the language was: "Please send your abstract to me at once, at the address below. I will have same brought up to date and examined and proceed to
close up the matter with you."
"144 Ark. 353, 222 S. W. 360 (1920).
22 Id. at 356, 222 S. W. at 361.
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contract had been formed in order to gain an advantage for himself.
In summary, it would appear that although there can be no certain
test for determining how a court will construe the language of the
offeree which might seem to add contingencies to the original offer, an
analysis of these cases seems to indicate that in determining whether
a contract has been formed, the courts look beyond the language of the
parties to the nature of the actions of the parties. If it appears that one
of the parties knowingly allowed the other to rely on him as an expected
source of gain, and subsequently, either arbitrarily, or because he has
found a better bargain, cuts the other party off from the source of
gain, it is probable that the court will construe the language in favor
of the expectant party.
HARRIET D. HOLT.
Criminal Law-Search of Private Dwelling-Incident to Arrest
In Clifton v. United States," federal revenue agents went to the
defendant's home with an informant who told the person answering his
knock that he wished to buy whiskey. He was told to see Earl Padgett,
who lived down the road. The investigators and the informant returned
to the defendant's backyard with Padgett who entered the back door and
came out with a half-gallon of non tax-paid whiskey. The investigators
paid Padgett for the whiskey, identified themselves and arrested him.
Then one of the investigators searched the defendant's home and found
illicit whiskey. The investigators had neither a warrant for the arrest
of Padgett nor a search warrant for the defendant's house. The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by this search was
denied by the trial court, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, saying: "The search in this case was
reasonable, being incident to the arrest of Padgett. It is not necessary
that the owner be the party arrested in such a case." 2
This decision has extended the law of search incident to arrest far
beyond bounds heretofore established. The court not only sanctioned
the search of a private dwelling when the arrest took place outside the
dwelling, but also held such a search to be reasonably incident to a
lawful arrest where the party arrested was not the owner of the dwelling.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to the people the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
'224 F. 2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955).
2 Id. at 331. This case is of great importance to North Carolina because this
state adopted the federal rule that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure
is, on proper objection, inadmissible in criminal proceedings. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-27 (1951).
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 3 This constitutional guaranty does not prohibit all searches and seizures without a
warrant, but only unreasonable ones. 4 The legal maxim, "every man's
house is his castle," applies with all its vigor to the right of search of
private dwellings, 5 and generally, under the federal and state constitutions and statutes, search of a private residence, without invitation or
consent, G may not be made without a search warrant,7 except when such
a search is incident to a lawful arrest," such search being considered
constitutionally reasonable.
It was decided at an early date that a search without a warrant of
the arrested person in order to protect the arresting officer, to deprive
the prisoner of potential means of escape or to avoid destruction of
evidence by the arrested person was reasonable 0 Later this right to
search without a warrant was extended beyond the actual person of the
one arrested to include "the place of arrest," i.e., "the area immediately
surrounding the accused" and "the premises under his immediate control." This, apparently, was to provide for the situation where the accused hurriedly disposes of the evidence by throwing it on the ground,
tossing it in a bush, or slipping it in an article of clothing hanging
nearby. 10 Thus, it has been held that where the person is arrested on his
own property the right of search extends a reasonable distance from
the place of arrest to include the land," garages, 12 sheds' 3 and other
buildings not used as a dwelling. Twenty-five feet has been held a
reasonable distance because not beyond the extent of the offender's activities;14 a similar result has been reached in the case of a barn one
hundred feet away, since it "was in the immediate vicinity of the
place where the arrest was made."' 5 But, under these circumstances
the private dwelling could not be searched. 16 Courts have held that the
'Similar or identical provisions are contained in constitutions of each of the
forty-eight states. They are collected in CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 7,
pp. 46-7 (1926).
' Cannon v. United States, 158 F. 2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Joyner v. State, 157
Fla. 874, 27 So. 2d 349 (1946).
'Gorman v. State, 161 Md. 700, 158 Atl. 903 (1932); Coburn v. State, 59
Okla. Crim. 333, 60 P. 2d 399 (1936).
'Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 219 (D. Mont. 1924); People v. Broas,
240 Mich. 495, 215 N. W. 420 (1927).
'Baxter v. United States, 188 F. 2d 119 (6th Cir. 1951); Brown v. United
States, 83 F. 2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1936).
' Roberson v. United States, 165 F. 2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948); Papani v. United
States, 84 F. 2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936).
' See MECHAN, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 13, pp. 62-4 (1950).
10 Ibid.
"Koth v. United States, 16 F. 2d 59 (9th Cir. 1927).
12 State v. Estes, 151 Wash. 51, 274 Pac. 1053 (1929).
"State v. Rotolo, 39 Wyo. 181, 270 Pac. 665 (1928).
"
Shew v. United States, 155 F. 2d 628 (4th Cir. 1946).
"Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1932).
0 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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dwelling cannot be searched when the arrest takes place in front of the
dwelling house, 17 when the arrest takes place in the yard to the house,' 8
or when the arrest takes place in an automobile driving away from the
house. 19 It was only when the arrest took place within the home that
a search of it could be made without a warrant. In Agnello v. United
States20 the court disapproved a search of the defendant's home without
a warrant where the arrest of defendant took place in a neighbor's home
some distance away. "One's house cannot lawfully be searched without
a search warrant," said the court, "except as an incident to a lawful
21
arrest therein." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the principal case stands alone in approving the search of the
home as incident to an arrest made outside the home.2 2 The court disregarded the criterion of reason generally applied by the courts limiting
the search to the necessities of the situation, i.e., the search of the
person and those immediate physical surroundings which may fairly be
deemed to be an extension of his person. The court appeared to rely
heavily on the "reasonableness under the circumstances" language of
Rabinowitz v. United States23 saying: "The Supreme Court indicated
that whether a search and seizure without a warrant is reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts of each
particular case and is not a question easily answered by recourse to
' 24

mechanical tests."

It is true that Justice Minton in the Rabinowitz case said: "The
recurring question of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case. What is a reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula." 25 However, a
close study of that case reveals that the "fixed formula" to which Justice
Minton was referring was the requirement laid down previously in
Trupiano v. United States 6 which required officers to secure a warrant
wherever practical before making a search. Justice Minton went on to
say: "The test [of a reasonable search] is not whether it is reasonable to
1"Poulos
v. United States, 8 F. 2d 120 (6th Cir. 1925); Thomas v. State,
27 Okla. Crim. 264, 226 Pac. 600 (1924).
1I Wallace v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 143, 275 Pac. 354 (1929) ; Fowler v. State,
114 Tex. Crim. 69, 22 S.W. 2d 935 (1930).
1 Papani v. United States, 84 F. 2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936).
20269 U. S. 20 (1925).
21 Id. at 32.
22In Patton v. State, 43 Okla. Crim. 436, 279 Pac. 694 (1929) where the defendant, seeing that he was about to be arrested, ran out the back door of his
home and was caught only twenty feet away, the court approved the incidental
search of part of the house on the ground that the arrest was so closely associated
with it that the arrest did virtually take place, or at least began within the house.
23339 U. S. 56 (1950).
2,4224 F. 2d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 1955).

2r339 U. S. 56, 63 (1950).
20 334

U. S. 699 (1948).
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procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable" ;27 and
in giving the reasons for holding the search there concerned reasonable,
he said: "The place of arrest was a business room to which the public,
including officers, was invited, the room was small and under the immediate and complete control of the defendant, and the search did not
extend beyond the room used for the unlawful purpose." (Emphasis
added.) 28 Therefore, even though Justice Minton used the phrase
"reasonable under the circumstances," he, nevertheless, applied the same
criterion of reason found in previous cases. Thus, it can be seen that
the Rabinowitz case neither extended the limits of search incident to
arrest nor set up a new criterion for determining the reasonableness of
such a search.
If homes can be searched and property seized as in the principal case,
and such property held and used as evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value and
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. To permit a search of
the defendant's home when he is arrested outside the home is, in itself,
,an unreasonable extension of the right to search incident to arrest; but,
to permit his home to be searched as incident to the arrest of a third
party outside his home is an even greater encroachment upon the Constitutional guaranty; for in such a case the privacy of the owner is involved and not that of the arrestee.
JERRY

A.

CAMPBELL.

Evidence-Admissibility of Partially Inaudible Recordings
Since the ascertainment of truth is the ultimate aim of our judicial
system, and because memory plays an important role in helping to
realize that goal, it is not surprising that more and more scientific devices which aid in evaluating the uncertain memories of men have found
their way into the courts.' The use of sound recordings as a means of
proof is an example of how a scientific device can supplement or, in
2
some cases, supplant the testimony of human witnesses in litigation.
The problem of the introduction into evidence of mechanically preserved sound is not new. As far back as 1906, in a suit for damages
because of an alleged diminution of property value due to noise, the
2- Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).
2

8Id.at 64.
a discussion of the development of the use of scientific devices in the
courtroom, see Baer, Radar Goes to Court, 33 N. C. L. Rtv. 355 (1955).
' For a discussion of the problems and advantages involved in the use of magnetic tape recordings as a means of proof and as a means of recording courtroom
proceedings, see Conrad, Magnetic Recordings in the Courts, 40 VA. L. REV. 23
(1954).
1 For
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Michigan court allowed a phonograph recording of sounds claimed to be
incident to defendant's business to be played before the jury. 3 The acceptance of such evidence has an obvious advantage, which accrues
to both judges and jurors: 4 it permits not only the proof by human
witnesses of the making of the sounds, but also a reproduction of the
sounds themselves by means of a mechanical witness. The disadvantages5 involved in the use of recorded evidence, especially in the area of
confessions, are not so obvious. One of them-the introduction into
evidence of a partially inaudible recording-will be discussed herein.
As with any other form of scientific evidence, a proper foundation
must be laid in order to introduce a recording into evidence. What
should constitute laying a proper foundation for introducing a recording
into evidence is succinctly set out in the recent Georgia case of Steve M.
6
Solomon, Inc. v. Edgar:
"(1) It must be shown that the mechanical transcription device
was capable of taking testimony. (2) It must be shown that the
operator of the device was competent to operate the device. (3)
The authenticity and correctness of the recording must be established. (4) It must be shown that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made. (5) The manner of preservation of
the record must be shown. (6) Speakers must be identified. (7)
'Boyne City, G. & A. R. R. v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, 109 N.W. 429 (1906).
For a review of later cases sustaining the admission of recorded sound into evidence, see Annot., 168 A. L. R. 927 (1947).
'"The wire recorder which reproduces the actual voice of the accused and
those who may be questioning him should be of much more value to the court and
the jury than a confession taken in shorthand and later reduced to writing, especially where an issue has been raised as to whether the confession was voluntarily
made." Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, -, 226 P. 2d 989, 995 (1951) ; in
People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 499, 197 P. 2d 1, 5 (1948), the court, referring to
sound movies, made a comment equally applicable to recordings: "Moreover, as a
method of presenting confessions, [they] appear to have a unique advantage in that
while presenting the admission of guilt, they simultaneously testify to facts relevant
to the issue of volition."
E.g., Wright v. State, 79 So. 2d 66 (Ala. App. 1954) (accused's own voice
might unduly impress jury) ; People v. Stephens, 117 Cal. App. 2d 653, 256 P. 2d
1033 (1953) (recordings inadmissible because inaudible, unintelligible, and containing extraneous inadmissible matter) ; People v. King, 101 Cal. App. 2d 500, 225
P. 2d 950 (1950) (re-recordngs of intentionally destroyed original recordings inadmissible because not best evidence); Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 61, 230
P. 2d 942 (1951) (recorded conversation between county attorney and co-defendant
inadmissible against defendant as hearsay and incompetent) ; Hunter v. Hunter,
169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 401 (1951) (recordings inadmissible because selfserving, violative of privileged husband-wife communication, and of very poor
quality).
Mechanical disadvantages of the use of recordings in evidence include the fragility of wire and tape recordings; the breakability of disc recordings; and the
ease with which wire and tape recordings can be spliced, erased, altered, etc.
a88 S. E. 2d 167 (Ga. App. 1955). See also Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim.
61, 230 P. 2d 942 (1951); Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 226 P. 2d 989
(1951).
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It must be shown that the testimony elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress."
With such a foundation required, it would seem that there could
arise few, if any, problems concerning the admissibility of mechanically
recorded sound into evidence. Nevertheless, in the area of recorded
confessions and admissions, even the laying of such a foundation as
suggested above does not necessarily solve the problem presented by a
mechanically defective recording, such as one which is partially inaudible.
As with the more common written or oral confession, the trial judge,
in most states, must pass upon the voluntariness of the confession before
it is permitted to be put into evidence. 8 Where a recorded confession
is involved, it has been said to be within the discretion of the trial judge
to determine, at the same time he decides upon the voluntariness of the
confession, whether the recording is sufficiently audible and coherent to
be of any probative value to the jury. 9 After the proper foundation is
laid, and the voluntariness of a partially inaudible recorded confession
is established, the problem of its introduction into evidence boils down
to this: How far should the courts go in treating this evidence like
ordinary written or oral testimony?
Suppose defendant is indicted for the murder of Mr. Victim. After
his arrest, while he is being escorted into the police station by the arresting officer, a passer-by overhears part of a conversation between defendant and the arresting officer, as follows: Officer: "Did you kill Mr.
Victim?" Defendant: "Yes." The passer-by continues walking past
the police station and hears no more of the conversation. For all he
knows, defendant, following his "Yes" answer, might have added: "But
I killed him in self defense." Without a doubt the passer-by would be
permitted, at defendant's trial for murder, to testify to the portion of
the conversation between defendant and the arresting officer which he
overheard, even though his testimony, standing alone, might be completely misleading. 10 Should a recorded confession or admission which
might conceivably be just as misleading because of the inaudibility of
portions of the defendant's statement be allowed into evidence just as the
testimony of the passer-by in the hypothetical posed?
A California court in the case of People v. Porter" felt that this
question should be answered in the affirmative. In that case the de7 Steve M. Solomon, Inc. v. Edgar, 88 S. E. 2d 167, 171 (Ga. App. 1955).
'20 Am. JuR., Evidence §§ 532-534 (1939).
' State v. Lorain, 141 Conn. 694, 109 A. 2d 504 (1954) ; State v. Alleman, 218
La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83 (1950) ; Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 61, 230 P. 2d 942
(1951) ; State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950) ; State v. Salle,
34 Wash. 2d 183, 208 P. 2d 872 (1949).
1020 Am. JOE., Evidence § 531 (1939).
"105 Cal. App. 2d 324, 233 P. 2d 102 (1951).
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fendants were convicted of murder. On appeal, the admission of rerecordings (made to reduce background noises) of the original wire recording of a conversation between the defendants in the district attorney's office was claimed to be error on the ground that the recordings
did not reflect the entire conversation. The appellate court affirmed the
conviction and said that "such objection is without merit since a witness may testify to part of a conversation if that is all he heard and it
appears to be intelligible."'1 2 Several other courts have adopted the
same position, that the mere fact that some portion of a recording is inaudible does not render the entire recording inadmissible."8
The danger inherent in this position is aptly pointed out in the
4
recent Alabama case of Wright v. State:1
"Mechanical methods of presenting evidence . . . can well
serve in bringing the truth to the trier of facts. A search for the
truth is the ultimate end of all legal proceedings. The value of
this type of evidence however depends upon its inherent accuracy.
Inaccurately produced mechanical evidence may distort the truth
instead of producing it. While courts accept scientific aids which
contribute to the ascertainment of the truth, enthusiasm for the
modern should never be permitted to endanger the safeguards of
personal liberties patiently erected by the legal architects through
the years....
"We think there is probable danger to the rights of an accused if the approach to the solution of the question [of the admissibility of partially inaudible recorded confessions] be made
by a mechanical application by analogy of principles developed
as to written or oral confessions which are placed in evidence
through the medium of a third party. An accused's own voice
reciting events must undoubtedly greatly impress a jury. For
" Id. at -, 233 P. 2d at 107.
"2People v. Jackson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 776, 271 P. 2d 196 (1954) ; Williams v.
State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 226 P. 2d 989 (1951) ; State v. Salle, 34 Wash. 2d 183,
208 P. 2d 872 (1949); United States v. Schanerman, 150 F. 2d 941 (3rd Cir.
1945) (dictum) ; State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 51 N. W. 2d 680 (1951), cert.
denied sub moin. Gensmer v. Minn., 344 U. S. 824 (1952) (dictum). But see
State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950) (recording not admissible
if in the trial judge's discretion it is too fragmentary and incoherent to be of
probative value).
Defendant was indicted and convicted of
14 79 So. 2d 66 (Ala. App. 1954).
second degree murder for running over a woman while allegedly driving his car.
In a recorded question and answer session at the police station, defendant admitted
driving the car at the time of the accident. At the trial defendant claimed he was
not the driver and objected to the trial court's permitting the prosecuion to put the
recording into evidence on the ground that parts of it were inaudible. Conviction
was reversed on other grounds, but the court made several comments and suggestions concerning the use of recorded confessions.
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this very reason it is essential that all material statements be
accurately recorded....
In a divorce case, Hunter v. Hunter,16 a Pennsylvania court apparently took the extreme opposite position from that taken in the Porter
case: a recorded conversation should be treated as analogous to a
writing 17 or a deposition' sought to be introduced into evidence. Its
position was that the entire conversation must be audible or the whole
recording is inadmissible.
But the position of the Hunter case is probably just as unsound
as that taken by the Porter case. Conceivably, the only inaudible portions of a recorded question-and-answer-type confession might be the
answers to immaterial questions. To exclude such a recording for that
reason alone would hardly be fair to the prosecution. It would impede
rather than expedite the ascertainment of the truth.
It would seem that in the area of recorded confessions, parts of which
are inaudible, some middle ground should be taken with regard to their
admissibility. If the recorded evidence is of the question and answer
variety, this middle ground would seem to be fairly obvious: where all
the questions are audible and only the answers to immaterial questions
are inaudible, then the recording, if otherwise unobjectionable, should
be admitted into evidence. Unhappily, not all situations present such
obvious answers. The Washington court in State v. Slater 9 came up
with what in many cases is probably the only practical "answer" to the
problem of fragmentary recordings: "Whether or not what can be heard
on the playing of such a recording is sufficiently audible and coherent
to have any probative value is a matter which should rest largely in the
20
discretion of the trial judge."
It should be noted that even in cases in which partially inaudible
recordings are held to be inadmissible to prove the statements contained
in them, they might nevertheless be sufficiently coherent to be admissible
22
2
for such purposes as impeachment ' or corroboration.
The Alabama court in Wright v. State23 has demonstrated a keen
insight into the problems incident to the introduction into evidence of
1

1;1d. at 71-72.
" 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 401 (1951).
" Generally, the entire writing, or at least all material parts of it, must be
offered or none of it is admissible. 20 Am. JuR., Evidence § 914 (1939).
" Generally, a deposition must go into evidence in whole or not at all, unless it
is shown that introduction of only part will not operate unfairly against the
opposite party. 16 Am. JUR., Depositions § 118 (1938).
1" 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950).
0
Id.at 364, 218 P. 2d at 333.
" State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P. 2d 984 (1952).
22 State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950).

" 79 So. 2d 66 (Ala. App. 1954).
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a mechanically defective recording of a confession or admission. Its
suggestions should prove valuable to courts which have not yet passed
on the question:
"To insure the accused of the absolute protection of his rights
to which he is entitled under the charitable policy of our criminal
laws, and assuming that the voluntary character and the accuracy
of the recording device has been established, we make the following suggestions as to trial procedure in the event an objection
is interposed to the introduction of a recorded statement on the
grounds that such statement is inaudible, or contains illegal, irrelevant, incompetent, or immaterial evidence.
"The trial court should first have the recording played or run
off before it out of the presence of the jury, counsel being afforded
the opportunity at this time of interposing appropriate objections. A transcription of the audible portions of the statement
should of course be made at this time.
"If either of such defects infect the recording there can be
doubt as to its admissibility.
"If the recording is inaudible in those portions likely to contain statements material to the issues, the recording should be
rejected if it is the only evidence offered as to the statement.
"Since most recordings are in question and answer form, the
question itself will shed light on the probable materiality of the
answer.
"If the parties who were present when the recording was
made are available and testify as to the statements made, the
recording, even though inaudible, in parts, should be admitted
as corroborative of the testimony of the witness or witnesses
testifying to the statement....
"If the recording contains illegal evidence it should be rejected unless such illegal portions can be erased from the tape, or
kept from the jury by stopping and starting the playing instrument. This for the reason, as before stated, we doubt the effectiveness of oral instructions to eradicate the prejudicial effect of
24
this type of evidence because of its inherent potency."
WILLIAm

E.

ZIMTBAUM.

Federal jurisdiction-Suits Against a State
A recent case, Lowes v. Manhattan City School District,' presents
some of the problems facing a federal court when it concludes the suit
2

'Id. at 73-74.

'222 F. 2d 258 (9th Cir. 1955).
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before it is one against a state. In the Lowes case plaintiff brought an
action for damages in a federal district court of California, alleging that
defendants had wrongfully taken possession of real property to which
she was entitled, had wrongfully removed a building therefrom, and had
converted certain personal property belonging to plaintiff. She assigned
diversity of citizenship as grounds for jurisdiction.2 Plaintiff was a
resident of Alaska ;3 defendants were the named California school district and certain individuals. The district judge dismissed the complaint on his own motion for want of complete diversity, because a state
is not a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and the school district was a part of the government of the state. The district judge also
held the complaint alleged no federal question. 4 On appeal the court
of appeals affirmed as to diversity, because the action against the school
district was in effect a suit against the state. But it reversed the district court on the matter of a federal question, finding that the alleged
acts of the individual defendants constituted an invasion of plaintiff's
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
At various times in the history of the federal court system at least
three possible grounds have been presented for jurisdiction over suits
against a state by a citizen of another state: (1) jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship; (2) jurisdiction based on section 13 of the
judiciary Act of 1789 ;5 and (3) jurisdiction based on a federal question.
The district court and the court of appeals correctly concluded in the
Lowes case that a state is not a citizen within the meaning of the judiciary acts granting federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 6 The United States Supreme Court at an early date held that a
228 U. S. C. § 1332 (1952) provides that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000
and is between citizens of different states.
328 U. S. C. § 1332 (b) supra note 2, provides that the word "State" shall
include the Territories and the District of Columbia.
'28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1952) provides that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds
$3,000 and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
"... the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of
a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens;
and except also between a state and citizens of other states ... in which latter case
it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction." The Judiciary Act of 1789,
§ 13, 1 STAT. 80.

0 State Highway Commission v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U. S. 194 (1928);
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Hickman, 183 U. S. 53 (1901); Postal Tele-

graph Cable Co. v. United States, 155 U. S. 482 (1894),

(sub. norn.) Postal

Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430 (1886).
See, generally, Annot., 147 A. L. R. 786 (1943).

Counties and municipal corporations are treated as citizens of their states for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 530

(1890) ; Pearl River County v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 270 Fed. 26 (5th Cir. 1921) ;
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. Ry., 255 U. S. 236 (1921); see Board of
Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District v. Huse, 17 F. 2d 785 (E. D. La.
1927).
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state cannot in the nature of things be a citizen of itself. Therefore a suit
between a state and a citizen of another state is not a suit between
citizens of different states, and, on this ground, the courts have no
jurisdiction. 8 It is not necessary for the state to be a formal party to
constitute a suit against the state.0 For example, in suits against state
officials or agencies, the state may nevertheless be the real party in
interest;1° such suits are held to be in effect against the state," and
therefore there is no diversity of citizenship. It was on this point that
it was held there was no diversity in the Lowes case.
In the celebrated case of Chisholm v. Georgia,1 2 the Supreme Court
held that the federal court had jurisdiction over a civil suit against the
state of Georgia by a citizen of South Carolina, brought under section
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Adverse reaction of the states to this
exercise of jurisdiction culminated in the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment. 13 Its provisions effectively bar any action 14 against 8 a
state by a citizen of another state,' 6 except in those cases where the
state has waived its immunity.' 7 It was said in Osborn v. Bank,'8 that
Stone v. South Carolina, supra note 6, at 430.
s See note 6, supra.
'Pacific Fruit & Lumber Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission,
41 F. Supp. 175 (D. Ore. 1941) ; cf. Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. S. 436 (1908).
1 State Highway Commission v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U. S. 194
(1928);
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. Hickman, 183 U. S. 53 (1901); Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Long, 181 F. 2d 295 (8th Cir. 1950); State Highway Commission v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 81 F. 2d 689 (8th Cir. 1936).
"' See note 10 supra. Of course it does not always follow that in a particular
suit the state is in fact the real party in interest. Where the suit is against an
officer in his individual capacity, e.g., Porter v. Beha, 12 F. 2d 513, 517 (2d Cir.
1926); Weiland v. Pioneer Irr. Co., 239 Fed. 519 (8th Cir. 1916), aff'd. 259
U. S. 498 (1922) ; (compare with California ex rel. McColgan v. Bruce, 129 F. 2d
421 (9th Cir. 1942) and Craig v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 125 F. 2d 66 (5th
Cir. 1942)); or is against an agency, which because of its powers, e.g. HunkinConkey Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 34 F. Supp. 26 (M. D.
Penn. 1940) ; may be recognized as a separate entity, the requisite citizenship may
be found, and jurisdiction taken. See Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Hickman,
183 U. S. 53 (1901); Missouri v. Homesteaders Life Ass'n., 90 F. 2d 543 (8th
Cir. 1937) ; Louisiana Highway Commission v. Farnsworth, 74 F. 2d 910 (5th Cir.
1935) ; Porter v. Beha, 12 F. 2d 513 (2d. Cir. 1926) ; Barton v. Delaware River
Joint Toll Bridge Commission, 120 F. Supp. 337 (D. N. 3. 1954).
122 U. S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
" "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U. S. CoxsT. amend. XI.
" By construction, the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits in admiralty
against a state. In re State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921).
1" The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits by states against citizens
of the same or another state. Southern Pacific Ry. v. California, 118 U. S. 109
(1886).
" The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits in the federal courts against
states by citizens of the same state. Hans. v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1901).
17 Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436 (1882) ; Gunter v. Atlantic Coastline Ry.,
200 U. S. 273 (1905). It was said that whenever a citizen of another state could
go into a state court in an action against a state, a citizen of another state could
go into a federal court in a similar action. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
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the Eleventh Amendment prohibited only those suits wherein the state
was a formal party to the record. 19 However, this restricted rule was
later modified to include within the operation of the Eleventh Amendment actions wherein the state was not a formal party but was the real
party in interest, against whom relief was sought. 20
Although the Eleventh Amendment was adopted primarily to preclude jurisdiction over suits of the Chisholm v. Georgia class, it is not
so limited. The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits suits against a
state by a citizen of another state where the plaintiff bases his claim
for relief on a federal question. 21 This is the result even though plaintiff asserts a violation by the state of his constitutional rights.2 2 Since
the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits where the state is the real
party in interest, it prohibits suits against state agencies or officers acting in their official capacity where a judgment for the plaintiff would
operate against or would require affirmative action by the state, even
though the state was not a formal party to the record.2
In the Lowes case the court of appeals did not recognize an Eleventh
Amendment problem. The explanation lies, perhaps, in the fact that
on the issue of a federal question the court was addressing itself to the
question of possible liability of the individual defendants. The Eleventh
Amendment has been construed not to apply to suits against state
officials who have acted or threaten to act under color of an unconstitutional statute,24 or who have acted or threatened to act unconstituCo., 154 U. S. 362, 391 (1893).

But now the rule is clearly otherwise; a state

may limit suits against itself to actions in its own courts. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Commission, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 465 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co.

v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).

"' 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).

"Old. at 857.

"0"As to what is deemed to be a suit against a state, the early suggestion that
the inhibition might be confined to those in which the state was a party to the
record . . . has long since been abandoned, and it is now established that the
question is to be determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by
the essential nature and effect of the proceedings as it appears from the entire
record." In re State of New York, 256 U. S. 490, 500 (1921); In re Ayers, 123

U. 2"S.Kennecott
443 (1887).Copper Corp. v. Tax Commission, 327 U. S. 573 (1946).
22 Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 (1933) ; Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 21 F. Supp. 822 (D. C. Ore. 1941). cf. Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 (1901).
" "Accordingly it is well settled that a suit against officers of a state, to compel
them to do acts which constitute a performance by it of its contracts, is, in effect,
a suit against the state itself." Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 9 (1891).
An action is against the state not only when it will be required to specifically
perform its contracts, but will be required to make pecuniary satisfaction for any
liability. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900).
4 Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917), Truax v.
Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U. S.
146 (1910), Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 211 U. S. 201 (1908); Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891).
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tionally under a constitutional statute. 25 The theory of these cases is
that such suits are not against state officers in their official capacity, but
rather are suits against such persons for their individual wrongs.20 An
action of this type is not against the state,2 7 and therefore a federal court
has jurisdiction to grant either legal 28 or equitable 20 relief.
In the light of the foregoing, if the court of appeals was correct in
finding that the suit against the school district was in effect a suit against
the state, and therefore there was no diversity of citizenship, must not
a suit against the school district for its alleged violation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights also be a suit against the state? It is submitted
that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. If this be so, then
it seems logical to conclude, absent a showing of waiver by the state of
its immunity, that the court was without jurisdiction over the subject
matter on the basis of a federal question because of the prohibitions of
the Eleventh Amendment. This would appear to be the result so long as
the school district remained a party, even though the court might validly
determine that the district court otherwise could exercise jurisdiction
over the wrongs committed by the individual defendants.
To avoid this complication in the Lowes type case, it is suggested
that the better analytical approach to the problem is the method adopted
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in O'Neil
v. Early.3° In that case the court, before ruling on diversity of citizenship or a federal question, first determined whether the suit was one
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment; that is, whether the suit was
"2"Neither will the constitutionality of the statute, if that be conceded, avail to
oust the federal court of jurisdiction. A valid law may be wrongfully administered
by officers of the state, and so as to make such administration an illegal burden
and exaction upon the individual." Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154
U. S. 362, 399 (1894). See also, Sterling v. Constantine, 287 U. S. 378 (1932) ;
Louisville & N. Ry. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). But see Barney v. City
of New York, 193 U. S. 430 (1904), where it was held that when the action
of the state official was contrary to law, and therefore unauthorized, it was not
action of the state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, on that ground, there was no federal question. But see, also, Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State
Officials, 40 HARv. L. REv. 969 (1927), where the author discusses the Barney
Case and its apparent subsequent repudiation.
" See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
27 Ibid.
"8Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897). See McCartney v. West Virginia,
156 F. 2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946).
2 Louisville & N. Ry. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917) ; Caldwell v. Siouxe Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ;
Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 211 U. S. 201 (1908) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908) ; McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U. S. 543 (1906) ; Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894) ; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S.
1 (1891).
" 208 F. 2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953). Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, brought an action against a Virginia county superintendent of schools
and a county school board for damages for wrongful discharge from her job as
school teacher.
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against the state, and, if so, whether the state had waived its immunity.
Upon finding that the suit was against the state and that the state had
not waived its immunity, the court dismissed the suit. It was unnecessary to rule on the question of diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
In cases where the Eleventh Amendment has been waived by the state,
jurisdiction can never be based on diversity of citizenship, but jurisdiction may be exercised on grounds of a federal question provided the
complaint properly alleges that the suit arises under the United States
Constitution, a federal statute or treaty.
If the court of appeals in the Lowes case was correct in holding
there was liability on the part of certain individual parties because of
their violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, then it is submitted
that the school district should have been dismissed as a party.31 In
that event the Eleventh Amendment would be no obstruction to the district court's jurisdiction. However, so long as the school district remained a party, it would seem that the court would have no jurisdiction
on any grounds.
LowRY M. BETTs.

Real Property-Recordation of Federal Condemnation Judgments in
the County of the Condemned Land
1
The recent federal case of United States v. Norman Lumber Co.
has presented to attorneys still another obstacle to overcome in the
long road of searching titles. This was an action brought by the federal
government to determine title to certain lands and to recover the value2
of timber removed therefrom. In federal condemnation proceedings
in 1936 certain lands in Montgomery County, North Carolina were
condemned. One Bruton and his heirs, the owners of the property here
in question, were made parties to those proceedings. The judgment
was docketed and cross-indexed in the office of the clerk of the United
States district court, and docketed, indexed and cross-indexed in the
office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Montgomery County, North
Carolina, but in the latter the names of the Bruton heirs did not appear.
The judgment was not registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Montgomery County, although the judgment by its terms required
that this be done. In 1951 the Bruton heirs executed a timber deed
to the Norman Lumber Company who then began to remove the timber from the property in suit.
31 See McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F. 2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946).

'United States v. Norman Lumber Co., 127 F. Supp. 518 (M. D. N. C. 1955),
aff'd, 223 F. 2d 868 (4th Cir. 1955).
'United States v. 1053.2 acres of land in Montgomery County, North Carolina.
[As cited in the District Court opinion, 127 F. Supp. 518 (M. D. N. C. 1955).]
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Although there were other matters involved in the original action,
the main question became: "Must a federal judgment of condemnation
of land be indexed and cross indexed in the county where the land
lies in order to give notice to a purchaser for value without notice of
the proceeding?"3 The district court answered this query in the negative and its decision was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The main reasons employed by these courts were generally as follows: (1) There can be no question that the condemnation proceeding
in rem gave title to the United States good against the world, as well as
the Bruton heirs;4 (2) The North Carolina statutes as to recordation
and cross indexing of judgments have no application to federal judgments of condemnation unless an act of Congress so provides, and no
such provision can be found.5 (3) The act authorizing federal condemnation in 19366 did provide for conformity with state practice "as
near as may be," but this conformity has been held to relate only to
court procedure and not to registration of muniments of title.7 The
court supported this view by stating: "That docketing and cross indexing of the judgment of condemnation in accordance with state law
for the protection of possible purchasers from the condemnee was not
regarded as a part of the procedure provided for by the old condemnation statute is properly inferable from the fact that no provision therefore is contained in Rule 71A, 28 U. S. C., which took the place of
the stautory procedure."
(4) The Lien of Judgments Act0 does not
apply to federal condemnation proceedings. "Congress recognized the
distinction in that it passed on the same day two separate and distinct
statutes with respect to these matters .... If it had been the intention
that the provisions of the Lien of Judgments Act apply to proceedings
under the Condemnation Act it would have been easy enough to so
provide; and the fact that no such provision was made indicates that
nothing of the sort was intended."' 1
'Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 870 (4th Cir. 1955).
"Ibid.
'Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1955).
825 STAT. 357, 40 U. S. C. 258 (1888).

' Chappell

v. United States, 160 U. S. 499 (1896).

8 Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1955).

'25 STAT. 357 (1888), 28 U. S. C. 1962 (1948). "Every judgment rendered
by a District Court within a State shall be a lien on the property located in such
State in the same manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions as a
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in such State, and shall cease to be
a lien in the same manner and time. Whenever the law of any State requires a
judgment of a State Court to be registered, recorded, docketed or indexed, or any
other act to be done, in a particular manner, or in a certain office or county or
parish before such lien attaches, such requirements shall apply only if the law of

such State authorizes the judgment of a court of the United States to be registered,
recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise conformed to rules and requirements relating to judgments of the courts of the State."
"0Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
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The court concluded that although the resulting situation would
work a severe hardship on attorneys, the question "whether docketing
and cross indexing of federal judgments of condemnation with state
court records should be required as a condition of validity as against subsequent purchasers from the condemnee is a matter for Congress, and,
so far, Congress has not seen fit to take action with regard to the
1
matter." '
This is, on the whole, a well reasoned and well supported decision;
however, there is one area of possible weakness, and that is the holding
of the court of appeals that the Lien of Judgments Act does not apply
to a federal condemnation proceeding. The court sought to draw an
inference that Congress did not intend the Lien of Judgments Act to
apply to federal condemnation proceedings from the fact that the two
statutes were passed on the same day and placed in different chapters
of the Statutes at Large. A closer examination of the passage of these
two acts indicates that there is little support for such an inference.
The bills were introduced at different times, 12 were sent to different
14
committees,' 3 discussed and amended on different occasions, and in
none of the committee or floor discussions on either bill is there any
reference made one to the other to indicate an intent to exclude condemnation proceedings from the scope of the Lien of Judgments Act.
The only point of similarity in the legislative history of these acts is
that the final reading and voice vote on the bills took place on the
same day.' 5 This history, of course, does not indicate conclusively that
Congress intended the Lien of Judgments Act to apply to federal condemnation proceedings, but neither does it seem to exclude the possibility of inferring such an intent, as was suggested by the court in the
present case. Indeed, a possible inference contra to the court of appeals' ruling may be found in the Committee Report presented to the
House of Representatives which stated: "The only purpose of the proposed legislation [Lien of Judgments Act] is to place judgments of
11 Ibid.

' -The Condemnation authorization was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 30, 1888. 19 CoNG. REc. 805 (1888). The Lien of Judgments Act
was introduced by the Judiciary Committee as a substitute for other bills that had
been pending in Congress for two sessions on March 7, 1888. Id. at 1829.
"3The Condemnation authorization was referred to the Committee on Public
Buildings and Grounds. 19 CONG. REc. 805 (1888). The Lien of Judgments
Act was referred to the Judiciary Committee. Id. at 1829.
14 The Condemnation authorization was amended and passed by the House of
Representatives on February 21, 1888. 19 CONG. REc. 1387 (1888) and amended
and passed by the Senate on July 17, 1888. Id. at 6401. The Lien of Judgments
Act was debated and passed by the House of Representatives on-March 22, 1888.
19 CONG. REc. 2359 (1888) and debated and passed by the Senate on July 9,
1888. Id. at 6014.
"5Both acts were examined and signed on July 21, 1888. 19 CoNG. REc. 6654
(1888).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

State and Federal Courts upon a perfect equality in each state, and that
the same provisions of State Law which regulate the docketing, registration, or recording of the judgments of the State Courts shall be
made applicable to the judgments of the United States Courts, when
authorized by the laws of such State."'16 Also, in all of the recorded
debate and discussion, covering a period of twelve years, concerning
the adoption of Rule 71A, which replaces the old statutory condemnation proceedings, there appears to be no mention of any activity beyond
the actual court procedure. 17 From this the court inferred that cross
indexing and registration of the judgment was not intended by the
Congress to be necessary. However, it would seem equally as proper
to infer that Congress intended for the Lien of Judgments Act to apply
to federal condemnation and felt no necessity to repeat the same instructions in this new rule.
The Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal, might reverse
this decision by disagreeing with the circuit court as to the applicability of the Lien of Judgments Act to federal condemnation proceedings. It appears from the record of debate on this act, the House of
Representative Reports and the adoption of Rule 71A with its silence
on this matter, that the Supreme Court, by taking a reasonable view
of these factors, might properly infer that Congress did intend for the
Lien Act to apply to federal condemnation proceedings. However,
in the event that the Supreme Court upholds the circuit court's ruling
on this point, the decision must be affirmed; for as Judge Hayes said
in the district court decision: "It is true it imposes a severe hardship
on attorneys undertaking to examine titles, to have to inquire at the
office of the clerk of the United States district court before he can be
sure there is no condemnation judgment entered there which is not
recorded and cross indexed in the county where the land lies, but this
inconvenience cannot outweigh the public interest in safe-guarding and
protecting the property of the United States in accordance with the
18
laws of the United States."'
If the Supreme Court affirms this decision, the obvious solution
to the resulting inequities which necessarily follow is that suggested
by Chief Judge Parker in the circuit court's opinion, i.e., a clear mandate from Congress requiring that federal condemnation proceedings be
indexed and recorded in the county where the land lies. Such a mandate should be enacted at once. The rights of the federal government
still would be adequately protected, the prospective purchaser for value
l Id. at 2359.
discussing the adoption of Rule 71A.
1 See 11 F. R. D. 213 (1952),
"United States v. Norman Lumber Co., 127 F. Supp. 518, 521 (M. D. N. C.
1955).
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would have proper notice, and the attorneys' duties would be eased
and clarified.
HERBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
Real Property-Riparian Rights
Because Y irrigated his cabbages and collards with the contaminated water of Beaverdam Creek, the North Carolina Commissioner
of Agriculture secured an injunction to prohibit the sale or disposition
of the crop. Y thereupon sued the defendant municipal corporations
for negligently permitting sewage to pollute the creek. The North
Carolina court reversed the judgment for damages below and said that
the motion for nonsuit should have been allowed.1 In the course of
the opinion the court stated that riparian rights were not established
in Y because he had no allegation in his complaint that he or his
lessor was a riparian proprietor, neither allegation nor proof that he
or his lessor had acquired a right to use the waters of the creek by prescription or adverse use, nor proof that he or his lessor had authority
and license from an alleged riparian owner to use the water. The
court then raised two important questions by quaere: (1) What is the
physical extent of riparian land?2 (2) Can a riparian owner transfer
his riparian rights to a non-riparian owner 'for use on non-riparian'
land? This note is concerned with the problems raised by these questions.3
In the common law riparian states4 that have considered the first
question, two theories have developed concerning the physical extent of
riparian land. One doctrine is the watershed rule 5 which requires land
' Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N. C. 619, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
'Land to be riparian must have the stream flowing over it or along its borders.
Stratbucker v. Junge, 153 Neb. 885, 46 N. W. 2d 486 (1951). The land must be
in actual contact with the water and mere proximity without contact is insufficient.
Kingsley v. Jacobs, 174 Ore. 514, 149 P. 2d 950 (1944).
Any treatment of the prior appropriation theory of water rights or of the
attainment of water rights by prescription or adverse use is beyond the scope of
this note. The doctine of prior appropriation- is that the one who first diverts and
applies to a beneficial use the waters of a stream has a prior right thereto, to the
extent of his appropriation. 56 AM. Jim., Waters § 291 (1947). Prescription or
adverse use is the acquiring of ownership of a water right by adverse use. The
use must be continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive under a claim of
right for the prescriptive period. 56 Am. JuR., Waters § 326 (1947).
'There are two separate and distinct systems of water rights in the United
States. One is the riparian doctrine which developed under the English common law.
The other is the prior appropriation doctrine which developed in the arid western
states of the United States. Generally the common law riparian doctrine is that
each riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water course flow by or through his
land in its natural course and quality, subject only to reasonable use by himself
and other riparian proprietors. The prior appropriation doctrine is the doctrine
that the first person to apply the water of a stream to a beneficial use is entitled
to the full flow of the stream, whether he is a riparian owner or not. Agnor,
Riparian Rights in the South Eastern States, 5 S. C. L. Q. 141, 143, 147 (1952).
'Research indicates that the following states have the watershed theory:
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to be within the watershed of a stream in order to enjoy riparian
rights.6 The principal reasons for this rule are that where water is
used on such lands it will, after use, return to the stream, and that as
the rainfall on such lands feeds the stream, the land is entitled, so to
speak, to the use of its water.7 Land beyond the watershed cannot be
regarded as riparian even though it is a part of a single tract abutting
the stream.8 Some states place a further limitation upon the application of the watershed rule in requiring that title to the entire tract
must be acquired in one transaction. 9 Under this limitation subsequent acquisitions of land adjacent to the riparian land will not be
riparian even if contiguous ;10 and where land once conveyed is thereby
cut off from the riparian tract and stream, it can never regain the
riparian right although it may thereafter be reconveyed to the person
owning the riparian land.11
The watershed rule appears to work satisfactorily in a common
law riparian state where the test for a permissive use of riparian water
is a reasonable use on riparian land, with use on non-riparian land
being unlawful. The status of the land, whether riparian or nonriparian, thus becomes an important preliminary question that must be
2
decided before even considering the reasonableness of the use.1
Arkansas: Harrell v. City of Conway, 271 S. W. 2d 924 (Ark. 1954). California:
Chauvet v. Hill, 93 Cal. 407, 28 Pac. 1066 (1892) ; Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal.
135, 58 Pac. 442 (1889); Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88
Pac. 978 (1907) ; modified to allow use of surplus water on non-riparian land in
Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933) ; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P. 2d 699 (Cal. 1947) ; City of Pasadena v. City
of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P. 2d 17 (1949). Kansas: Clark v. Allaman,
71 Kan. 206, 80 Pac. 571 (1905). Kansas is now practically a prior appropriation
state having changed by statute which was upheld in Ex rel. Emery v. Knapp,
167 Kan. 546, 207 P. 2d 440 (1949).
See Busby, American Water Rights
Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and Some of Its Broad Trends With Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5 S. C. L. Q. 106, 127
(1952). Massachusetts: Sturtevant v. Ford, 280 Mass. 303, 182 N. E. 560 (1932) ;
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87 (1913). New
Jersey: McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489
(1906). South Dakota: Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 60 S. D. 592, 245 N. W. 390
(1932).
Texas: Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927);
Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733 (1905).
Virginia:
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S. E. 408 (1925) ; Town of
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 508 (1921).
'A watershed is the boundary line between one drainage area and others.
Webster, International Dictionary, 2886 (2d Ed. 1940).
'Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907).
' Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907) ; Sayles
v. City of Mitchell, 60 S. D. 592, 245 N. W. 390 (1932).
' Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733 (1905) ; Crawford
Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781 (1903) ; Rancho Santa Margarita v.
Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938).
'0 Boehmer v. Big Rock Creek Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 26, 48 Pac. 908 (1897).
" Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938) ; Yearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 Pac. 804 (1928).
1 Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 509 (1921).
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The main advantage of the watershed rule seems to be that it allows
a riparian owner to use riparian water on his land to the maximum
extent possible while at the same time protecting the lower riparian
owners, since the water after use will drain back into the stream from
which it was extracted.
The second doctrine defining the extent of riparian land developed
in Oregon. 13 This theory is that the limit to riparian land is common
ownership and contiguity to the stream. The Oregon court said in
Jones v. Conn:14 "It is plainly not possible to define the distance to
which the riparian proprietor's right to use the water for irrigation or
other purposes extends, but this will depend upon the circumstances
of each case. The only general rule that can be laid down is that the
distance and use should be reasonable. .

.

.

It would seem therefore

that any person owning land which abuts upon or through which a natural stream of water flows is a riparian proprietor, entitled to the rights
of such, without regard to the extent of his land, or from whom or
when he acquired titles."
This rules appears to have the practical advantage of extending the
riparian right to the greatest acreage under one ownership while still
protecting other riparian owners by requiring reasonable use.15 But
as Oregon now has virtually adopted the prior appropriation doctrine,
this rule doesn't seem to be of practical importance. 16
North Carolina has said that a riparian owner is one who owns the
land which the water covers or which forms its banks. 17 In Young
v. City of Asheville' 8 it was stated that land to be riparian must be in
actual contact with the stream, and that mere proximity without contact is insufficient. Thus, although it seems clear that riparian land
in North Carolina is land touching or in actual contract with the
stream itself, whether it is merely one tract or extends to subsequent
acquisitions or is limited by the watershed is yet to be decided.
If in a future case the North Carolina court finds it necessary to
define the exact physicial extent of riparian land, it is hoped that the
policy adopted will be one of protecting the lower riparian owner
while still allowing maximum usage of the riparian water consistent
" Apparently Oregon has been the only state to follow this doctrine. Jones v.
Conn., 39 Ore. 30, 64 Pac. 855 (1901), rehearing denied 39 Ore. 46, 65 Pac. 1068
(1901).
11 Id. at 39, 64 Pac. at 858.
Ir Note, 27 MIcE. L. Rxv. 479 (1929).
"' See Busby, American Water Rights Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and
Some of Its Broad Trends With Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water
Resources, 5 S. C. L. Q. 106, 127 (1952) ; Maloney, The Balance of Convenience
Doctrine in the South Eastern States, Particularly as Applied to Water (Addendum), 5 S. C. L. Q. 159, 180 (1952).
7 City of Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N. C. 615, 54 S. E. 453 (1906);
Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N. C. 50 (1832).
18 241 N. C. 618, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
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with this protection. The rule allowing a riparian owner to use water
on his land within the watershed seems to achieve this result.
May a riparian owner transfer his riparian right to a non-riparian
owner to use on non-rip~arian land?19 The majority of the common
law riparian states that have considered this problem say that no legal
right exists in a riparian owner for the use of the riparian water
beyond his riparian land. 20 Any such use is an infringement upon
the rights of the lower riparian owners ;21 and since a riparian owner
cannot exercise any right of use on non-riparian land, he cannot, as
against a lower riparian owner, confer it upon another.2 2 However,
as between himself and his grantee, the riparian owner is estopped to
prevent the non-riparian use.23 The lower riparian owner is allowed
to enjoin any diversion of water to non-riparian land in order to prevent the diversion from growing into a prescriptive right.2 4 Some
states qualify this rule by requiring the lower riparian owner to show
actual injury before he can prevent the diversion. 25
1"

A riparian owner does not own the water of a stream but he owns a usufruc-

tuary right which is the right of reasonable use of the water. Rancho Santas
Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938).
20 California: Gould v. Stafford, 77 Cal. 66, 18 Pac. 879 (1888); Miller
&
Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 Pac. 502 (1909) ; modified
to allow use of surplus water on non-riparian lands in Chow v. City of Santa
Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933) ; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra,
180 P. 2d 699 (Cal. 1947) ; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908,
207 P. 2d 17 (1949).
Connecticut: Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 Atl. 60 (1930); Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277
(1884).
Georgia: Hendrix v. Robert Marble Co., 175 Ga. 389, 165 S. E.
223 (1932) ; Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S. E. 897 (1909). Massachusetts:
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87 (1913).
Massachuetts allows diversion to non-riparian land if there is no actual injury to
lower riparian owners for any present or future use. New Jersey: McCord v. Big
Brothers Movement, 185 Atl. 480 (N. J. 1936). Pennsylvania: Lackawanna Mills
v. Scranton Gas & Water Co., 300 Pa. 303, 150 Ati. 633 (1930) ; Scranton Gas &
Water Co. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 240 Pa. 604, 88 Atl. 24 (1913). South
Dakota: Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 60 S. D. 592, 245 N. W. 390 (1932). Texas:
Woody v. Durham, 267 S. W. 2d 219 (Texas 1954); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117
Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927) ; Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86
S. W. 733 (1905).
Texas allows use of surplus water on non-riparian land.
Virginia: Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S. E. 2d 700 (1942);
Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 508 (1921). West Virginia:
Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S. E. 535 (1913).
Washington: Hunter
Land Co. v. Laigenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926) ; Brown v. Chase, 125
Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923); Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac.
342 (1915) ; Town of Kirkland v. Cochrane, 87 Wash. 528, 151 Pac. 1082 (1915).
Washington allows use of surplus water on non-riparian lands.
21 Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S. E. 535 (1913) ; Town of Purcellville
v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S. E. 2d 700 (1942).
" Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 49 Pac. 577 (1897); Kennebunk v. Maine
Turnpike Authority, 147 Me. 149, 84 A. 2d 433 (1951).
23 Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 110 Pac. 927
(1910) : Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927).
"' Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 1124, 211 Pac. 11 (1922) ; Anaheim Union Water
Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907).
" "The question in such a case is not whether the diversion, being for a legitimate use, is in quantity such as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances
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This rule confines the use of riparian water strictly to riparian land
and prohibits its use on non-riparian land either by a riparian owner
or his grantees as against a lower riparian owner. Although this rule
protects the lower riparian owner, it doesn't seem to answer the policy
question of why a non-riparian owner who needs water should not be
allowed to use it, where there is a surplus in the stream that would
run unused into the sea.
Apparently to prevent this waste of water and to promote maximum
usage, a group of states, who once followed the doctrine above, have
modified it either by constitutional amendment or by statutory change
so as to allow appropriation of surplus water for beneficial use on nonriparian land.2 6 Therefore, in Texas Co. v. Burkett,2 it was held that
the riparian owner has the right to divert water to non-riparian land
where water is abundant and no possible injury could result to lower
riparian owners. But in Smith v. Wheeler,28 in an action for injunction
against diversion of water from riparian land to non-riparian land, it was
said that the burden was on the defendant to prove the existence of surplus water.
This group of states seems to have achieved a desirable balance between protecting the riparian owner while still promoting maximum
usage of water so as to prevent waste. If a state having a history of
common law decisions holding that riparian water cannot be used on
non-riparian land is to adopt the modified doctrine of the above states,
it should probably do so by statute or constitutional amendment.
A minority group of states allows riparian water to be used on nonriparian land.29 This is done by treating the fact of use on non-riparian
land as merely another circumstance to consider in deciding the reasonableness of the use. As was said in Gillis v. Chase,30 it is simply
a question of fact whether the use of water by a riparian owner either
.. but only whether it causes actual damage to the person complaining." Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87 (1913); "The
riparian owner has the right to divert riparian water to non-riparian land, where
water is abundant and no possible injury could result to lower riparian owners."
Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927).
".California: City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207
P. 2d 17 (1949); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P. 2d 699 (Cal.
1947) ; Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933). Nebraska:
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781 (1903). Texas: Woody
v. Durham, 267 S. W. 2d 219 (Tex. 1954); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16,
296 S. W. 273 (1927) ; Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733
(1905). Washington: Hunter Land Co. v. Laigenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41
(1926); Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
27117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927).
28107 Cal. App. 2d 451, 237 P. 2d 325 (1951).
.New Hampshire: Poire v. Serra, 106 A.'2d 39 (N. H. 1954) ; Gillis v. Chase,
67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891). Oklahoma: Smith v. Stanolina Oil & Gas Co.,
197 Okla. 499, 172 P. 2d 1002 (1946). Vermont: Kasuba v. Graves, 109 Vt. 191,
194 Atl. 455 (1937) ; Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt. 505, 74 AUt 94 (1909).
20 67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891).
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for his own purposes or for sale to others, is under all the circumstances a reasonable one. The mere fact his grantees are taking water
to their non-riparian land does not per se make their use unreasonable
but that fact together with the size and character of the stream, the
quantity appropriated, and all the circumstances may make the use unreasonable.8 '
Before following the above rule it should be considered that of the
three states presently adhering thereto, two states, New Hampshire
and Vermont, regard their non-navigable streams as practically publici juris32 while the third state, Oldahoma,38 follows the theory with
the aid of a statute.
In Pugh v. Wheeler,34 North Carolina recognized the reasonable
use doctrine. 5 The North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Harris
v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.36 that a riparian owner may use water
for any purpose to which it can be beneficially applied, provided he
does not inflict substantial injury on those below him. Then in Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co.37 the court further stated that a
riparian owner has a right to make all the use he can of the stream as
long as he does not pollute it or divert it from its natural channel and
abstract so much of the water as to prevent others from having equal
enjoyment with himself or does not use the same in such an unreasonable manner as to materially damage or destroy rights of other riparian
owners. Does the court mean that the reasonable use doctrine applies only to use on riparian land and that any use on non-riparian
land that substantially injures lower riparian owners is unlawful?
Or does it mean that the reasonable use doctrine applies to use on both
riparian and non-riparian land and that such use on non-riparian land
is just another factor in deciding the reasonableness?
It would seem that since North Carolina does not have a statute defining the rights of riparian owners, and that since our non-navigable
8
streams are not publici juris,that our court should not follow the lead
of those states allowing use of riparian water on non-riparian land
under the theory that such use is just another factor in deciding the
3182 Vt. 505, 74 Atl. 94 (1909).
' 2 Annot. 14 A. L. R. 330 (1921).

"Smith v. Stanolina Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P. 2d 1002 (1946).
"19 N. C. 50 (1832).
""What

constitutes a reasonable

use is

a question of fact having regard to the

subject matter and the use; the occasion and manner of its application; its object
and extent and necessity; the nature and size of the stream; the kind of business

to which it is subservient; the importance and necessity of the use claimed by one

party, and the extent of the injury caused by it to the other." Dunlap v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 212 N. C. 814, 820, 195 S. E. 43, 47 (1938).
36153 N. C. 542, 69 S. E. 623 (1910).
3212 N. C. 814, 195 S. E. 43 (1938).
" State v. Glenn, 52 N. C. 321 (1859); Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N. C. 50 (1832).
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reasonableness. If such a result is desired, it should be left to the
legislature.
If North Carolina does not allow a riparian owner to use riparian
water on non-riparian land, then it probably will not allow the riparian
owner to convey such a right that he does not have.
JAMEs

A.

ALSPAUGH.

Torts-Breach of Contractual Duty as Negligence
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently affirmed a ruling
of the superior court striking portions of a complaint relating to a contract between the defendants and a third party as irrelevant to the issue
of actionable negligence.' The complaint charged the defendants with
negligence in performance of their plumbing contract with the Board of
Education of Mecklenburg County, with which the plaintiff had a contract for the general construction work in the erection of a new school
building, the same building for which the defendants were to do the
plumbing. The plaintiff's cause of action was that defendants performed
their contract negligently, resulting in broken water lines which flooded
the foundations of the building, causing large sections of the walls and
underpinning erected by the plaintiff to cave in and break off, and thereby necessitating their repair by the plaintiff.
Upon motion by defendants, allegations in the complaint referring to
many sections of the plumbing contract were striken by the trial court.
The plaintiff's appeal challenged the striking of these allegations. In
affirming this ruling, the Court recognized that in an action for negligence it is competent to allege and prove the existence of a contract for
the purpose of showing the relationship of the parties out of which
arises the common law duty to use ordinary care, but held that it is not
competent to allege specific terms of the contract as a standard for
2
measuring the defendant's conduct.
There is a liberal doctrine in North Carolina whereby an injured
plaintiff may sue in tort for damages caused by the defendant's breach
of a contract, even though the plaintiff is not a party thereto.3 The
plaintiff was allowed to sue for breach of contract as a third party beneficiary in the case of Gorrell v. Water Supply Co.,4 where the complaint
alleged a contract between the defendant, the Greensboro Water Supply
Co., and the City of Greensboro for furnishing the city with water for
v. Toomey, 242 N. C. 358, 87 S. E. 2d 893 (1955).
Id.at 363, 87 S. E. 2d at 898.
' Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896); Bond & Willis v.
Hilton, 44 N. C. 308 (1853); Robinson v. Threadgill, 35 N. C. 39 (1851).
'124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E. 720 (1899). See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home
Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220 (1912) ; Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S.
57 (1905).
21 Pinnix
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the use of its citizens and with sufficient force at all times to protect the
inhabitants of the city against loss by fire. Further allegations were
that a fire was started in a building some thirty feet from the plaintiff's
storeroom; that the fire company was prompt in answering the alarm,
and could easily have extinguished the fire in time to save the plaintiff's property, but was unable to do so for the reason that the defendant
did not supply water with sufficient pressure as it had agreed to do in
the contract. A demurrer to this complaint on the ground that the
plaintiff was neither a party nor privity to the contract was overruled,
and this was upheld on appeal. The court observed that the object of the
contract was the benefit and comfort of the citizens of Greensboro, in
comparison to which the benefit of the city, the nominal contracting
party, would be small and would not justify the grants, concessions,
privileges, benefits and payments made to the defendant. It was further reasoned that the protection of private as well as public property
was in the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and therefore
the plaintiff could maintain an action for its breach. The Court admitted that the majority of decisions in point up to that time had been
decided contra, but declared that it should adopt "that line (of reasoning)
which is most consonant with justice and the 'reason of the thing.' "
Two years later, upon substantially the same facts, the question was
squarely raised whether the injured party should recover in tort or in
contract.' The jury found that the defendant had breached its contract
with the city and that the plaintiff had been injured by the negligence
of the defendant. The trial court entered judgment for damage as upon
breach of contract, to which the plaintiff excepted and appealed, claiming that under section 1255 of The Code,7 an execution issued upon a
judgment founded on an action of tort has superior advantages in its enforcement over an execution issued upon a judgment founded upon contract. Although this contention of the plaintiff was not passed upon,
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for
damage done him by the negligence of the defendant, as prayed for,
since the plaintiff had stated facts out of which arose an obligation, its
breach by the defendant, and the resulting damage to the plaintiff.8 Later
North Carolina cases have strongly affirmed this position. 9
Id. at 335, 32 S. E. at 722.
' Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N. C.

375, 38 S. E. 912 (1901).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44 (1950), which provides: "Mortgages, deeds of trust
or other conveyances upon condition of public service corporations upon their
property or earnings cannot exempt said property or earnings from execution for
the satisfaction of any judgment obtained in the courts of the State against such
corporations for labor and clerical services performed, or torts committed whereby
any person is killed or any person or property injured."

128 N. C. at 378-79, 38 S.E. at 914.
oBrown v. Bowers Construction Co., 236 N. C. 462, 73 S. E. 2d 147 (1952);
Canestrine v. Powell, 231 N. C. 190, 56 S.E. 2d 566 (1949); Powell v. Wake
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Another instance of breach of contract in which a party to the
contract is liable in tort to one not a party thereto may be found in the
telegraph "mental anguish" cases, where the addressee seeks to recover
from the telegraph 'company for its negligent failure to properly transmit
and deliver a message. North Carolina allows recovery upon this basis
in the case of intrastate messages ;1o however, where interstate messages
are involved, the federal rule governs, and no recovery is allowed for
mental anguish. 1
A telegraph company is a quasi public corporation, and, as such, the
law implies duties upon it for the benefit of the public.' 2 It is required
to receive, and promptly transmit and deliver with reasonable care all
messages tendered in good faith.' 4
Thus we see the recognition of the availability of a tort action in
cases of breach of contract. This provides persons who would usually
have no standing to recover on the contract itself with a means of recoupment for damage caused to them by the defendant's conduct.
But this recognition may be important to persons who are parties
to the contract as well as to those who are not. An illustration of this
Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916) ; Morton v. Washington Light

and Water Co., 168 N. C. 582, 84 S. E. 1019 (1915); Orinoco Supply Co. v.
Shaw Brothers Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 428, 76 S. E. 273 (1912) ; Helms v. Telegraph Co., 143 N. C. 386, 55 S. E. 831 (1906); Jones v. Water Co., 135 N. C.
553, 47 S. E. 615 (1904); Gastonia v. McEntee-Peterson Engineering Co., 131
N. C. 363, 42 S. E. 858 (1902).
" Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S. E. 2d 681
(1942); Gibbs v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 N. C. 516, 146 S. E. 209
(1928); Waters v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 194 N. C. 188, 138 S. E. 608
(1927); LeHue v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 174 N. C. 332, 93 S. E. 843
(1917); Smith v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 168 N. C. 515, 84 S. E. 796
(1915).
" Ward v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 226 N. C. 175, 37 S. E. 2d 123
(1946); Gibbs v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 N. C. 516, 146 S. E. 209
(1928); Johnson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 175 N. C. 588, 96 S. E. 36
(1918); Askew v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 174 N. C. 261, 93 S. E. 773
(1917); Norris v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 174 N. C. 92, 93 S. E. 465
(1917). In the first case in which recovery was allowed in North Carolina, the
Court said that the action was in reality in the nature of tort for negligence, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover compensation for actual damage done
him, and that mental anguish was actual damage. Young v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044 (1890).
"Green v. Telegraph Co., 136 N. C. 489, 49 S. E. 165 (1904); Cashion v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 124 N. C. 459, 32 S. E. 746 (1899).
x' Barnes v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 156 N. C. 150, 72 S. E. 78 (1911).
' Cordell v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 N. C. 402, 63 S. E. 71 (1908);
Cogdell v. Telegraph Co., 135 N. C. 431, 47 S. E. 490 (1904).
In order for a plaintiff to recover for mental anguish caused by failure or delay
in delivery, it is essential that it be shown that the telegraph company had knowledge of the urgency and importance of the message. Powell v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 191 N. C. 356, 131 S. E. 762 (1926); LeHue v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 175 N. C. 561, 96 S. E. 29 (1918); Holler v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 N. C. 336, 63 S. E. 92 (1908) ; Suttle v. Western Union Telegraph
Co, 148 N. C. 480, 62 S. E. 593 (1908) ; Darlington v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 127 N. C. 448, 37 S. E. 479 (1900).
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may be found in the common carrier field, which furnishes a widely litigated instance of breach of contract giving rise to an action in tort. It
would seem that the availability of a tort action would prove highly
beneficial when we consider that because of their public character, common carriers have been held to the highest degree of care.
When a common carrier takes into its possession goods for transportation, the law imposes upon the carrier the duty 1) to transport the
goods safely, and 2) to deliver them within a reasonable time.' 5 Therefore, upon showing delivery of the goods to the carrier in good condition,
and their delivery to the consignee in bad condition, the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the carrier.' 0
Herein lies one advantage of a tort action in such cases.
The obligations that are assumed by a carrier as to passengers are
to transport them safely and reasonably swiftly to their destination.
Again, if these obligations are breached by the negligence of the carrier, the injured party may sue for breach of contract, or may sue in
tort. Here, too, the passenger is aided in a tort action against the carrier for injuries caused by the negligence of the carrier in that, upon
a showing that the injury was received without fault on the part of the
plaintiff, in consequence of the breaking or failure of the vehicle, roadway, or other appliances owned or controlled by the carrier in making
the transit, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, which the carrier must rebut.

17

In making a choice of remedies, another major factor is the question
of damages. Generally, an action in tort will prove more advantageous
in this respect, as it will permit a greater recovery. Damages recoverable in an action for breach of contract are usually such as may reason" Holmes v. East Carolina R. R., 186 N. C. 58, 118 S. E. 887 (1923) ; Bivens
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 176 N. C. 414, 97 S. E. 215 (1918) ; Forrester V.
Southern R. R. Co., 147 N. C. 553, 61 S.E. 524 (1908).
At common law, in the absence of a special contract, the liability of a common
carrier for the loss of or injury to property is practically that of an insurer, exceptions being damage or loss caused by an act of God, acts of the public enemy,
negligence of the .shipper, and the inherent nature of the goods. American Cigarette and Cigar Co. v. Garner, 229 N. C. 173, 47 S. E. 2d 854 (1948) ; Merchant
v. Lassiter, 224 N. C. 343, 30 S. E. 2d 217 (1944) ; Moore v. Southern R. R. Co.,
183 N. C. 213, 111 S. E. 166 (1922); Morris v. American Ry. Express Co., 183
N. C. 144, 110 S. E. 855 (1922); Perry v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 171 N. C.
158, 88 S. E. 156 (1916) ; Harrell v. Owens, 18 N. C. 273 (1835).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U. S. 416 (1926);
Precythe v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 230 N. C. 195, 52 S. E. 2d 360 (1949) ;
Fuller v. Virginia and Carolina Southern R. R. Co., 214 N. C. 648, 200 S. E. 402
(1938); Edgerton v. Southern R. R. Co., 203 N. C. 281, 165 S. E. 689 (1932);
Moore v. Southern R. R. Co., 183 N. C. 213, 111 S. E. 166 (1922); Bivens v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 176 N. C. 414, 97 S. E. 215 (1918); Mitchell v.
Carolina- Central R. R. Co., 124 N. C. 236, 32 S. E. 671 (1899).

"Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N. C. 399, 45 S. E. 2d 546 (1947);
Lindsey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 173 N. C. 390, 92 S E. 166 (1917);
McCord v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R. R. Co., 134 N. C. 53, 45 S. E. 1031 (1903);
Lambeth v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 66 N. C. 494 (1872).
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ably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was made, 18 whereas in an action of personal injury resulting from the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the present worth of all damages sustained in consequence of the defend20
ant's tort.' 9 In proper cases it is possible to recover punitive damages
21
and damages for mental suffering in tort actions, while they are not
22
usually allowed in actions for breach of contract.
Many attempts have been made to define the areas of tort liability
and liability upon contract, one of the most common of which is upon
the basis of misfeasance and nonfeasance, the acting negligently and the
complete failure to act. However, the line between the two is sometimes
difficult to draw, as in some instances there may be tort liability in cases
of nonfeasance. In these cases there is a duty to act, independent of the
contract; thus a carrier is bound to furnish transportation facilities for
freight; 23 a telegraph company is bound to receive and transmit messages tendered in good faith ;24 and an innkeeper is bound to provide
25
suitable accomodations for his guests.
Although the writs have been swept away, and there is now only
one form of civil action, 20 some of their difficulties of application still
remain. Perhaps it was well said that "when the ghosts of case and
assumpsit walk hand in hand at midnight, it is sometimes a convenient
and comforting thing to have a borderland in which they may lose them27
selves."
JOHN D. ELLER, JR.
18 Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953) ; Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949); Meier v. Miller, 229 N. C. 243, 49
S. E. 2d 396 (1948) ; Price v. Goodman, 226 N. C. 223, 37 S. E. 2d 592 (1946) ;
Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N. C. 406, 35 S. E. 2d 277 (1945) ; Chesson v. Keickheifer Container Co., 216 N. C. 337, 4 S. E. 2d 886 (1939).
"Mintz v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 233 N. C. 607, 65 S. E. 2d 120
(1951) ; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1944) ;
Lane v. Southern R. R. Co., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 855 (1926); Ledford v.
Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922).
"8Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N. C. 567, 5 S. E. 2d 828 (1939) ; Purcell
v. Richmond and Danville R. R. Co., 108 N. C. 414, 12 S. E. 954 (1891).
21 Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 212 N. C. 211, 193 S. E. 31
(1937) ; Muse v. Ford Motor Co., 175 N. C. 466, 95 S. E. 900 (1918) ; Bailey v.
Long, 172 N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916); Carmichael v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 157 N. C. 21, 72 S. E. 619 (1911); Britt v. Carolina
Northern R. R. Co., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908); Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906) ; Bowers v. Telegraph Co., 135 N. C. 504, 47
S. E. 597 (1904).
22 Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N. C. 723, 73 S. E. 2d 785 (1952) ; Lamm
v. Shingleton,
231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949).
2
2 N. C. GEx. STAT. § 60-111 (1950).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-371 (1953).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 72-1 (1950).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT.
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§ 1-9 (1953).
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